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Abstract
CompCert is the first commercially available optimiz-
ing compiler that is formally verified, using machine-
assisted mathematical proofs, to be exempt from mis-
compilation. The executable code it produces is proved
to behave exactly as specified by the semantics of the
source C program. This article gives an overview of
the design of CompCert and its proof concept and then
focuses on aspects relevant for industrial application.
We briefly summarize practical experience and give an
overview of recent CompCert development aiming at in-
dustrial usage. CompCert’s intended use is the compi-
lation of life-critical and mission-critical software meet-
ing high levels of assurance. In this context tool quali-
fication is of paramount importance. We summarize the
confidence argument of CompCert and give an overview
of relevant qualification strategies.
1 Introduction
Modern compilers are highly complex software systems
that try to find a balance between various conflicting
goals, like minimal size or minimal execution time of
the generated code, maximum compilation speed, max-
imum retargetability, etc. The code generation process
itself is a collection of complex transformation steps,
many of which are essentially NP-complete, as e.g.,
the standard backend phases instruction selection, in-
struction scheduling, or register allocation. The qual-
ity of a compiler typically is rated on the efficiency of
the generated code whereas its price should not be too
high. In consequence compilers have to be efficiently
developed, their structure is complex, they contain many
highly tuned and sophisticated algorithms – and they
can contain bugs. Studies like [12, 5] and [14] have
found numerous bugs in all investigated open source and
commercial compilers, including compiler crashes and
miscompilation issues. Miscompilation means that the
compiler silently generates incorrect machine code from
a correct source program. Such wrong-code errors can
be detected in the normal software testing stage which,
however, does typically not include systematic checks
for them. When they occur in the field, they can be hard
to isolate and to fix.
Whereas in non-critical software functional software
bugs tend to have bigger impact than miscompilation
errors, the importance of the latter dramatically in-
creases in safety-critical systems. Contemporary safety
standards such as DO-178B/C, ISO-26262, or IEC-
61508 require to identify potential functional and non-
functional hazards and to demonstrate that the software
does not violate the relevant safety goals. Many verifica-
tion activities are performed at the architecture, model,
or source code level, but all properties demonstrated
there may not be satisfied at the executable code level
when miscompilation happens. This is not only true
for source code review but also for formal, tool-assisted
verification methods such as static analyzers, deductive
verifiers, and model checkers. Moreover, properties as-
serted by the operating system may be violated when its
binary code contains wrong-code errors induced when
compiling the OS. In consequence, miscompilation is
a non-negligible risk that must be addressed by addi-
tional, difficult and costly verification activities such as
more testing and more code reviews at the generated as-
sembly code level.
The first attempts to formally prove the correctness
of a compiler date back to the 1960’s [10]. Since 2015,
with the CompCert compiler, the first formally veri-
fied optimizing C compiler is commercially available.
What sets CompCert apart from any other production
compiler, is that it is formally verified, using machine-
assisted mathematical proofs, to be exempt from mis-
compilation issues. In other words, the executable code
it produces is proved to behave exactly as specified by
the semantics of the source C program. This level of
confidence in the correctness of the compilation process
is unprecedented and contributes to meeting the high-
est levels of software assurance. In particular, using the
CompCert C compiler is a natural complement to apply-
ing formal verification techniques (static analysis, pro-
gram proof, model checking) at the source code level:
the correctness proof of CompCert C guarantees that all
safety properties verified on the source code automati-
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cally hold as well for the generated executable.
Usage of CompCert offers multiple benefits. First,
the cost of finding and fixing compiler bugs and ship-
ping the patch to customers can be avoided. The testing
effort required to ascertain software properties at the bi-
nary executable level can be reduced. Whereas in the
past for highly critical applications (e.g., according to
DO-178B Level A) compiler optimizations were often
completely switched off, using optimized code now be-
comes feasible.
The article is structured as follows: in Sec. 2 we give
an overview of the CompCert design and illustrate its
proof concept in Sec. 3. Sec. 4 summarizes experi-
mental results and practical experience obtained with
the CompCert compiler. Specific developments required
for industrial application of CompCert are discussed in
Sec. 5. Sec. 6 summarizes the confidence argument
for CompCert and discusses tool qualification strategies,
Sec. 7 concludes.
2 CompCert Structure
Like other compilers, CompCert is structured as a
pipeline of compilation passes, depicted in Figure 1
along with the intermediate languages involved. The
20 passes bridge the gap between C source files and ob-
ject code, going through 11 intermediate languages. The
passes can be grouped in 4 successive phases, described
next.
Parsing Phase 1 performs preprocessing (using an
off-the-shelf preprocessor such as that of GCC), tok-
enization and parsing into an ambiguous abstract syn-
tax tree (AST), and type-checking and scope resolution,
obtaining a precise, unambiguous AST and producing
error and warning messages as appropriate. The LR(1)
parser is automatically generated from the grammar of
the C language by the Menhir parser generator, along
with a Coq proof of correctness of the parser [9]. Op-
tionally, some features of C that are not handled by the
verified front-end are implemented by source-to-source
rewriting over the AST. For example, bit-fields in struc-
tures are transformed into regular fields plus bit shift-
ing and masking. The subset of the C language han-
dled here is very large, including all of MISRA-C 2004
[11] and almost all of ISO C99 [8], with the exceptions
of variable-length arrays and unstructured, non-Misra
switch statements (e.g. Duff’s device).
C front-end compiler The second phase first re-
checks the types inferred for expressions, then deter-
mines an evaluation order among the several permitted
by the C standard. This is achieved by pulling side
effects (assignments, function calls) outside of expres-
sions, turning them into independent statements. Then,
local variables of scalar types whose addresses are never
taken (using the & operator) are identified and turned
into temporary variables; all other local variables are al-
located in the stack frame. Finally, all type-dependent
behaviors of C (overloaded arithmetic operators, im-
plicit conversions, layout of data structures) are made
explicit through the insertion of explicit conversions
and address computations. The front-end phase out-
puts Cminor code. Cminor is a simple, untyped inter-
mediate language featuring both structured (if/else,
loops) and unstructured control (goto).
Back-end compiler This third phase comprises 12 of
the passes of CompCert, including all optimizations and
most dependencies on the target architecture. It bridges
the gap between the output of the front-end and the
assembly code by progressively refining control (from
structured control to control-flow graphs to labels and
jumps) and function-local data (from temporary vari-
ables to hardware registers and stack frame slots). The
most important optimization performed is register allo-
cation, which uses the sophisticated Iterated Register
Coalescing algorithm [7]. Other optimizations include
function inlining, instruction selection, constant propa-
gation, common subexpression elimination (CSE), and
redundancy elimination. These optimizations imple-
ment several strategies to eliminate computations that
are useless or redundant, or to turn them into equivalent
but cheaper instruction sequences. Loop optimizations
and instruction scheduling optimizations are not imple-
mented yet.
Optimization passes exploit the results of two in-
traprocedural static analyses: a forward “value” anal-
ysis, that infers variation intervals for integer variables,
known values for floating-point variables, and nonalias-
ing information for pointer variables; and a backward
“neededness” analysis, generalizing liveness analysis by
identifying the bits of a variable or memory location that
do not contribute to the final results of a function.
Optimizations and static analyses are performed
over the RTL intermediate representation, consisting of
control-flow graphs of “three-address” machine-like in-
structions. RTL code is not in Single Static Assign-
ment (SSA) form. Consequently, static analyses are
more costly and optimizations slightly less aggressive
than what is possible with SSA-based compilation algo-
rithms. The reason for not using SSA is that, at the be-
ginning of the CompCert project, the semantic proper-
ties of SSA and the soundness arguments for SSA-based
algorithms were poorly understood. The recent work of
Demange et al. [2] and Zhao et al. [15] provides formal
foundations for SSA-based optimizations.
Assembling The final phase of CompCert takes the
AST for assembly language produced by the back-end,
prints it in concrete assembly syntax, adds DWARF de-
bugging information coming from the parser (cf. Sec. 5),
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Figure 1: General structure of the CompCert C compiler
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and calls into an off-the-shelf assembler and linker to
produce object files and executable files. To improve
confidence, CompCert provides an independent tool that
re-checks the ELF executable file produced by the linker
against the assembly language AST produced by the
back-end.
3 The CompCert Proof
The CompCert front-end and back-end compilation
passes are all formally proved to be free of miscompi-
lation errors; as a consequence, so is their composition.
The property that is formally verified is semantic preser-
vation between the input code and output code of every
pass. To state this property with mathematical precision,
we give formal semantics for every source, intermediate
and target language, from C to assembly. These seman-
tics associate to each program the set of all its possible
behaviors. Behaviors indicate whether the program ter-
minates (normally by exiting or abnormally by causing
a run-time error such as dereferencing the null pointer)
or runs forever. Behaviors also contain a trace of all ob-
servable input/output actions performed by the program,
such as system calls and accesses to “volatile” memory
areas that could correspond to a memory-mapped I/O
device. Arithmetic operations and non-volatile memory
accesses are not observable.
Technically, the semantics of the various languages
are specified in small-step operational style as labeled
transition systems (LTS). A LTS is a mathematical rela-
tion current state trace−→ next state that describes one step
of execution of the program and its effect on the pro-
gram state. For assembly-style languages, the state of
the program comprises the values of processor registers
and the contents of memory. The step of computation
is the execution of the instruction pointed to by the pro-
gram counter (PC) register, which updates the contents
of registers and possibly of memory. For higher-level
languages such as C, states have a richer structure, in-
cluding not just memory contents and an abstract pro-
gram point designating the statement or expression to
execute next, but also environments mapping variables
to memory locations, as well as an abstraction of the
stack of function calls.
A generic construction defines the observable behav-
iors from these transition systems, by iterating transi-
tions from an initial state (the initial call to the main
function): S0
t1→ S1 t2→ ··· tn→ Sn. Such sequences of tran-
sitions can stop on a state Sn from which no transition is
possible. This describes a terminating execution, where
the program terminates either normally (on returning
from the main function) or on a run-time error (e.g.
dereferencing the null pointer, or dividing by zero). Al-
ternatively, an infinite sequence of transitions describes
a program execution that runs forever. In both cases,
the concatenation of the traces t1.t2 . . . describes the I/O
actions performed. Several behaviors are possible for
the same program if non-determinism is involved. This
can be internal non-determinism (e.g. multiple possi-
ble evaluation orders in C) or external non-determinism
(e.g. reading from a memory-mapped device can pro-
duce multiple results depending on I/O behaviors).
To a first approximation, a compiler preserves seman-
tics if the generated code has exactly the same set of
observable behaviors as the source code (same termina-
tion properties, same I/O actions). This first approxima-
tion fails to account for two important degrees of free-
dom left to the compiler. First, the source program can
have several possible behaviors: this is the case for C,
which permits several evaluation orders for expressions.
A compiler is allowed to reduce this non-determinism
by picking one specific evaluation order. For example,
consider the following C program:
#include <stdio.h>
int f() { printf("f"); return 1; }
int g() { printf("g"); return 2; }
int main() { return f() + g(); }
According to the C semantics, two behaviors are al-
lowed, producing fg or gf as output, depending on
whether the call to f or the call to g occurs first. Comp-
Cert chooses to call g first, hence the compiled code has
only one behavior, with gf as output.
Second, a C compiler can “optimize away” run-time
errors present in the source code, replacing them by any
behavior of its choice. (This is the essence of the no-
tion of “undefined behavior” in the ISO C standards.)
Consider an out-of-bounds array access:
int main(void)
{ int t[2];
t[2] = 1; // out of bounds
return 0;
}
This is undefined behavior according to ISO C, and
a run-time error according to the formal semantics of
CompCert C. The generated assembly code does not
check array bounds and therefore writes 1 in a stack
location. This location can be padding, in which case
the compiled program terminates normally, or can con-
tain the return address for ”main”, smashing the stack
and causing execution to continue at PC 1, with unpre-
dictable effects. Finally, an optimizing compiler like
CompCert can notice that the assignment to t[2] is
useless (the t array is not used afterwards) and remove
it from the generated code, causing the compiled pro-
gram to terminate normally.
To address the two degrees of flexibility mentioned
above, CompCert’s formal verification uses the follow-
ing definition of semantic preservation, viewed as a re-
finement over observable behaviors:
If the compiler produces compiled code
C from source code S, without reporting
compile-time errors, then every observable
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Figure 2: Performance of CompCert-generated code relative to GCC 4.1.2-generated code on a Power7 processor.
Shorter is better. The baseline, in blue, is GCC without optimizations. CompCert is in red.
behavior of C is either identical to an allowed
behavior of S, or improves over such an al-
lowed behavior of S by replacing undefined
behaviors with more defined behaviors.
In the case of CompCert, the property above is a
corollary of a stronger property, called a simulation di-
agram, that relates the transitions that C can make with
those that S can make. First, 15 such simulation dia-
grams are proved independently, one for each pass of the
front-end and back-end compilers. Then, the diagrams
are composed together, establishing semantic preserva-
tion for the whole compiler.
The proofs are very large, owing to the many passes
and the many cases to be considered – too large to be
carried using pencil and paper. We therefore use ma-
chine assistance in the form of the Coq proof assistant.
Coq gives us means to write precise, unambiguous spec-
ifications; conduct proofs in interaction with the tool;
and automatically re-check the proofs for soundness and
completeness. We therefore achieve very high levels of
confidence in the proof. At 100 000 lines of Coq and 6
person-years of effort, CompCert’s proof is among the
largest ever performed with a proof assistant.
4 Practical Experience
CompCert targets the following three architectures: 32-
bit PowerPC, ARMv6 and above, and IA32 (i.e. In-
tel/AMD x86 in 32-bit mode with SSE2 extension). On
PowerPC and ARM, the code generated by CompCert
runs at least twice as fast as the code generated by GCC
without optimizations, and approximately 10% slower
than GCC 4 at optimization level 1, 15% slower at opti-
mization level 2 and 20% slower at optimization level 3.
These numbers were obtained on the benchmark suite
shown in figure 2, along with the performance numbers
for a Power7 processor. This suite comprises compu-
tational kernels from various application areas: signal
processing, physical simulation, 3d graphics, text com-
pression, cryptography. By lack of aggressive loop opti-
mizations, performance is lower on HPC codes involv-
ing dense matrix computations. On IA32, due to its
paucity of registers and its specific calling conventions,
CompCert is approximately 20% slower than GCC 4 at
optimization level 1.
CompCert provides a general mechanism to attach
free-form annotations (text messages possibly mention-
ing the values of variables) to C program points, and
have these annotations transported throughout compila-
tion, all the way to the generated assembly code, where
the variable names are expressed in terms of machine
code addresses and machine registers. Apart from im-
proving traceability this source annotation mechanism
enables WCET tools to compute more precise WCET
bounds. Indeed, WCET tools like aiT [6] operate di-
rectly on the executable code, but they sometimes re-
quire programmers to provide additional information
(e.g., the bound of a while loop) that cannot easily be
reconstructed from the machine code alone. When us-
ing CompCert, such information can be safely extracted
from annotations inserted at the source code level. A
tool automating this task was developed by Airbus: it
generates a machine-level annotation file usable by the
aiT WCET analyzer. Compiling a whole flight control
software from Airbus (about 4 MB of assembly code)
with CompCert resulted in significantly improved per-
formance in terms of WCET bounds and code size [3].
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5 Industrial Application
An industrial application of CompCert is not only at-
tractive because of the high confidence in the correct-
ness of the compilation process. As mentioned in Sec. 1
it opens up the possibility to use optimized code even in
highly critical avionics projects, hence enabling higher
software performance. Furthermore, CompCert’s anno-
tation mechanism as described in Sec. 4 can contribute
to further improving confidence by providing proven
traceability information [3].
A prerequisite for industrial use of a compiler is the
possibility to debug the program under compilation.
While previous versions of CompCert only provided
rudimentary debugging support, CompCert now is able
to produce debug information in the Dwarf 2 format.
It generates debugging information for functions and
variables, including information about their type, size,
alignment and location. This also includes local vari-
ables so that the values of all variables can be inspected
during program execution in a debugger. To this end
CompCert introduces an additional pass which com-
putes the live ranges of local variables and their loca-
tions throughout the live range. Furthermore CompCert
keeps track of the lexical scopes in the original C pro-
gram and creates corresponding Dwarf 2 lexical scopes
in the debugging information.
The CompCert sources can be downloaded from In-
ria1 free of charge; the current state of the development
can be viewed on Github 2. In addition, a revisioned
distribution is available from AbsInt, either as a source
code download or as pre-compiled binary for Windows
and Linux. To create the pre-compiled binary, Coq is
executed under Linux to create the OCaml source files
and the corresponding correctness proof. This provides
a proven-in-use argument for Coq usage since there is a
wide community using Coq under Linux/Unix. Further-
more it makes sure the Windows and Linux versions op-
erate on the same sources. Under Windows the OCaml
sources are compiled with a native Windows compiler;
to execute CompCert no additional libraries (e.g., cyg-
win or mingw) are needed. The package also contains
pre-configured setup files for the compiler driver to con-
trol the cooperation between the CompCert executable
and the external cross compiler required for preprocess-
ing, assembling and linking.
Translation Validation. Currently the verified part of
the compile tool chain ends at the generated assembly
code. In order to bridge this gap we have developed
a tool for automatic translation validation, called Valex,
which validates the assembling and linking stages a pos-
teriori.
Valex checks the correctness of the assembling and
linking of a statically and fully linked executable file
1http://compcert.inria.fr/download.html
2https://github.com/AbsInt/CompCert
against the internal abstract assembly representation
produced by CompCert. In order to use Valex, the C
source files for the program must be compiled by Comp-
Cert and the command-line option -sdump must be
specified. This option instructs CompCert to serialize
the internal abstract assembly representation in JSON
[4] format.
The generated .json-files as well as the linked exe-
cutable are then passed as arguments to the Valex tool.
The main goal is to verify that every function defined
in a C source file compiled by CompCert and not opti-
mized away by it can be found in the linked executable
and that its disassembled machine instructions match
the abstract assembly code. To that end, after parsing
the abstract assembly code Valex extracts the symbol
table and all sections from the linked executable. Then
the functions contained in the abstract assembly code
are disassembled. Extraction and disassembling is done
by two invocations of exec2crl, the executable reader of
aiT [1].
exec2crl tries to decode all symbols in the linked ex-
ecutable which have the same name as a function sym-
bol contained in any of the input .json-files. If one
of these symbols in the linked executable is not a func-
tion, exec2crl reports a warning that it cannot decode
the given symbol. The decoded control-flow graph is
linearized to a sequential list of its instructions sorted
by their address.
The main stages of Valex deal with function and vari-
able usage. For every function in the abstract assem-
bly code, Valex matches the instructions in the abstract
assembly code against the instructions contained in the
linked executable. Valex supports both the cases that
an abstract assembly instruction directly corresponds to
one machine instruction, and that it corresponds to a se-
quence of machine instructions. It checks whether the
arguments of the instructions are equivalent and the in-
tended instruction mnemonic is used.
For every variable defined in a C source file compiled
by CompCert Valex checks whether the corresponding
symbol can be found in the symbol table. It also checks
that the corresponding size and initialization data is con-
tained in the linked executable and matches the initial-
ization data in the abstract assembly. Valex reports an
error if one of these checks fails.
In a further stage Valex reconstructs the mapping
from symbolic names and labels to machine addresses
computed by the linker, checks that there is an address
for every symbolic name and label and ensures that all
occurrences are always mapped to the same address.
Additionally, Valex tests for variables and functions
whether they are placed in their corresponding sections,
which are either the default sections, or the sections
specified by the user in the C files using #pragma sec-
tion. When using the GCC tool chain, Valex also checks
whether uninitialized variables that were placed into one
of CompCert’s internal sections Data, Small Data,
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Const or Small Const are contained in the .bss
or .sbss section of the executable.
Currently Valex can check linked PowerPC executa-
bles that have been produced from C source code by
the CompCert C compiler using the Diab assembler and
linker from Wind River Systems, or the GCC tool chain
(version 4.8, together with GNU binutils 2.24).
6 The Confidence Argument
As described in Sec. 3 all of CompCert’s front-end and
back-end compilation passes are formally proved to be
free of miscompilation errors. These formal proofs
bring strong confidence in the correctness of the front-
end and back-end parts of CompCert. These parts in-
clude all optimizations – which are particularly difficult
to qualify by traditional methods – and most code gen-
eration algorithms.
The formal proofs do not cover the following aspects:
1. Correctness of the specifications used for the for-
mal proof, i.e. the formal semantics of C and as-
sembly.
2. The parsing phase, i.e. the transformation from the
input C program to CompCert’s abstract syntax.
3. The assembling and linking phase.
Those aspects can be handled well by traditional quali-
fication methods, i.e. via a validation suite, to comple-
ment the formal proofs. A validation suite for Comp-
Cert is currently in development and will be available
from AbsInt.
Especially the parsing phase (item 2) can be seen
as a straightforward code generation pass which does
not include any optimizations and only performs lo-
cal transformations. Since the internal complexity of
this stage is low, systematic testing provides good con-
fidence. CompCert can print the result of parsing in
concrete C syntax, facilitating comparison with the C
source.
However, it is possible to provide additional confi-
dence beyond the significance of the validation suite, in
particular for items 1 and 3. CompCert provides a refer-
ence interpreter, proved correct in Coq, that can be used
to systematically test the C semantics on which the com-
piler operates. Likewise, the Valex validator described
in Sec. 5 provides confidence in the correctness of the
assembling and linking phase. It performs translation
validation of the generated code which is a widely ac-
cepted validation method [13].
At the highest assurance levels, qualification argu-
ments may have to be provided for the tools that pro-
duce the executable CompCert compiler from its ver-
ified sources, namely the “extraction” mechanism of
Coq, which produces OCaml code from the Coq devel-
opment, combined with the OCaml compiler. We are
currently experimenting with an alternate execution path
for CompCert that relies on Coq’s built-in program exe-
cution facilities, bypassing extraction and OCaml com-
pilation. This alternate path runs CompCert much more
slowly than the normal path, but fast enough that it can
be used as a validator for selected runs of normal Comp-
Cert executions.
In summary, CompCert provides unprecedented con-
fidence in the correctness of the compilation phase: the
’normal’ level of confidence is reached by providing a
validation suite, which is currently accepted best prac-
tice; the formal proofs provide much higher levels of
confidence concerning the correctness of optimizations
and code generation strategies; finally, the Valex transla-
tion validator provides additional confidence in the cor-
rectness of the assembling and linking stages.
7 Conclusions
CompCert is a formally verified optimizing C compiler:
the executable code it produces is proved to behave
exactly as specified by the semantics of the source C
program. Experimental studies and practical experi-
ence demonstrate that it generates efficient and compact
code. Further requirements for industrial application,
notably the availability of debug information, and sup-
port for Linux and Windows platforms have been estab-
lished. Explicit traceability mechanisms enable a seam-
less mapping from source code properties to properties
of the executable object code. We have summarized
the confidence argument for CompCert, which makes
it uniquely well-suited for highly critical applications.
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